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Communists made no attempt to conceal that such was the Party program.

To renounce loyalty towards one's country and to eradicate patriotic feelings inculcated in school and in the University—this was the price of entrance upon the road of progress. Not everyone was prepared to pay this price. Our group disintegrated. "The most promising young government politicians," Stefan and Henryk, became Stalinists; George and I withdrew. Those who crossed the line thought the rest of us weak poets, bookworms incapable of action. Perhaps their opinion was not far from the truth. I am not sure, however, that cast-iron consistency is the greatest of human virtues.

Gamma became a Stalinist. I think he felt uneasy writing his passionless poetry. He was not made for literature. Whenever he settled down before a sheet of paper he sensed a void in himself. He was incapable of experiencing the intense joys of a writer, either those of the creative process or those of work accomplished. The period between his nationalism and his Stalinism was for him a limbo, a period of senseless trials and disillusionment.

The Communist Party was illegal in our country. Membership in it was punishable under a paragraph of the law that defined any attempt to deprive Poland of any part of her territory as a criminal offense. Party leaders, realizing they had nothing to gain at the time from illegal activity, tried to reach and sway public opinion through sympathizers not directly involved in the Party. A number of publications appeared in Poland which followed the Party line, adapting it to the level of unwary readers. The group in which Gamma found himself started to edit one such periodical. Contacts with Party messengers took place in secret, often on trips to the neighboring forests. By now, most of the members of our original group had completed

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tianity to a cult of History takes place imperceptibly. Without doubt, the greatest success of the Imperium would come if it could install a Party-line pope in the Vatican. A mass in the Basilica of St. Peter in Rome, performed by such a pope, with the assistance of dignitaries from those subjugated countries which are predominately Catholic, would be one of the most important steps toward the consolidation of the world empire.

Christians who serve the Eastern Imperium ingeniously resolve the problem posed by Jesus' words "Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's." Until now the contrast between the ordinary man and Caesar has never been effaced. Christianity guaranteed this division by teaching that every man had his own history, distinct from the history of the social group or the nation to which he belonged. If, as is taught today from the Elbe to Vladivostok, the history of every man is nothing more than the reflection of the history of his class, and if his class is personified in Caesar, then it is clear that the man who rebels against Caesar rebels against himself. Christians who agree to this thesis prove they no longer believe in God's judgment of each man's acts. Fear that History will damn them eternally motivates their submission.

The Party knows that the conflict between true Christianity and the Revolution is fundamental. The Revolution aims at the highest goal the human species has ever set for itself on earth, the end of "man's exploitation of man." To do this, it must replace man's desire for profit with a feeling of collective responsibility as a motive for action. This is a distant and honorable goal. Probably it will not be reached quickly; and probably, too, for a long period it will be necessary to maintain a constant terror in order to instill that feeling of responsibility by force.

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CHAPTER II

THE EAST EUROPEAN SETTING

1. *General Factors*

175 In the early spring and summer of 1944 the Soviet armies breached the German defenses on the Dniester and the Bug and, advancing through the territories of pre-war Romania and Poland, entered a region which, for purposes of convenience, may be termed Eastern Europe.[1] By the time World War II had ended a year later Soviet power was established as far as the Elbe river in the west and the borders of Greece in the south. The path was cleared for the Communist reorganization of Eastern Europe.

In the first months the primary lever of political and social change was the Soviet Army itself. But the new imperial apparatus did not long depend solely upon direct military intervention. In the wake of the advancing armies a well-organized political apparatus moved which, though few in numbers, was endowed with much of the militancy and dynamism of the Soviet system.

● 665 Generally, post-war Communist leadership was Moscow-trained, had served long apprenticeships in the Comintern apparatus, and was familiar with the hierarchal operations of an organization which invested all initiative in the Moscow center.[2] Although some of the leaders had led a furtive underground existence between the wars, they were no longer genuine revolutionaries, but agents of an imperial power designated with imposing the developed Soviet political and economic system on countries whose languages

[1] The term Eastern Europe, as used here, includes what is often referred to as Central and Eastern Europe, but does not include Russia, which is frequently considered part of Eastern Europe. Certain German writers, seeing in the region a mosaic of under-developed and politically weak states, have sometimes used the phrase *Zwischen-Europa* ("Between Europe"). For the purposes of this paper, the term Eastern Europe is taken to be coextensive with the Soviet satellite sphere, excluding East Germany, but including Yugoslavia whose regime broke with Moscow in 1948.

[2] The character of the post-war seizure of power by the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe is treated more fully below, pp. 42-43. For a good general account of these events, see Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (Oxford, 1950), pp. 187-229.

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665 and customs they knew, and of which they were usually natives.[3] As subsequent events were to show, the transplantation of the Soviet system to Eastern Europe proved to be far more complicated than these former Cominternists had perhaps anticipated. Local conditions and traditions of the captive countries were everywhere to balk them, demanding improvisations and flexibilities for which they were unprepared.

The story of land collectivization in the Satellites from 1945 to 1953 is consequently the story of the interaction between a highly developed system of agrarian exploitation torn from its Soviet context, and the indigenous conditions of Eastern Europe which confronted Party political-economic planners at every turn. A brief review of these conditions is in order.

2. *The Rise of the Peasant Proprietor* (1800-1939)

565 423 Although some remnants of an essentially feudal land system survived in areas of Poland and Hungary (particularly the latter) until the eve of World War II, the major features of East European feudalism, contrary to popular belief, died before the beginning of the 20th century.[4] Serfdom was finally abolished by parliamentary legislation or revolutionary action by 1860: in the Austrian "hereditary lands" (including Slovenia, Bohemia and Moravia) as early as 1781; in Croatia in 1848; in Hungary (including Slovakia) in 1849; in Congress Poland in 1861; and in Romania in 1864. Emancipation of the Serbian and Bulgarian peasantry resulted from progressive limitations of the political power of their Turkish overlords, a process which took place throughout the 19th century.

As was the case in Russia, however, emancipation did not solve the basic problems of East European rural society. Indeed, with the growing incorporation of Eastern Europe into the world agricultural market, the problems grew even more severe in the 19th century. Except in Bulgaria and Serbia, where a class of peasant smallholders emerged within the framework of Ottoman society, the abolition of serfdom did not establish a sturdy, independent peasantry such as existed in the West. Even in Bulgaria

[3] "The East European revolution . . . was imposed from outside and from above . . . [and therefore cannot] justly be compared with the revolutions of 1688, 1789, and 1917." (Seton-Watson, p. vii.).

[4] It is necessary, one writer points out, to stress the incorrectness of the widely-held view that "the feudal system, with the characteristic features of the large latifundia, continued to prevail east of the Elbe until the arrival of the Soviet Army." (Ygael Gluckstein, *Stalin's Satellites in Europe*, London, 1952, p. 13).

423 there were many indigenous forces which played a role as well. The war shook the fragile structure of East European society and made it vulnerable to rapid and drastic change.

Indeed, even in pre-war years the agitation for land reform had begun to take on serious character. By 1939 the rising peasant demands in Poland for further division of the landed estates had posed a critical challenge to the Sanacja regime and there were signs that the Hungarian ruling class were beginning to recognize the inevitability of land redistribution.

423 665 The impact of the war on the consciousness of the people was most dramatically expressed in the political reorientation which accompanied it. Tito's Partisan movement drew important support from the ranks of the impoverished peasantry. The sharp upward surge of the Czechoslovak Communist Party after the war may be taken, at least in part, as an indication of a more radical mood in the population as a whole. In Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, the ruling classes, which contracted disastrous alliances with Hitler's New Order, had thereby discredited themselves, and gave way to spokesmen for radical action.

These changes were reflected politically in the fact that the main opposition to the Communists in the post-war era came, not from the remnants of the pre-war ruling classes, but from the more progressive peasant, and to a degree, from Social Democratic parties. The general framework of political and social thought had shifted to the left, and parties such as the Smallholders in Hungary and the Peasant Party in Poland assumed the dominant positions denied them in pre-war political life.[18]

423 Under these conditions the rapid conclusion of land reforms was inevitable and the Communists appeared, not as the instigators of reform, but as its overseer. Indeed, the reforms instituted in 1945-46 were not "socialist" in character, even in Hungary and

[18] The history of the non-Communist agrarian reform movements in Eastern Europe, prior to, and during World War II is yet to be written. The task is made somewhat difficult by present Communist efforts to blot out all evidence of the very existence of such movements outside the realm of the Communist Parties. The "Village Explorers" in Hungary, for example, who identified the high standards of peasant culture with an expected national renaissance, helped pave the way for the great reforms of 1945. Other groups, such as the Plowman's Front in Romania and the "Pladne" Agrarians in Bulgaria, also played, or might have played, important roles. The Polish Peasant Party is also worth considering in this respect because its role in the wartime resistance gave it roots among the peasantry sometimes lacking in the inter-war official "peasant" parties.

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Poland where they were most extensive. On the contrary, like the reforms of the 1920s, they signified a broadening of the property basis of society, not its limitation, and their aim was redistribution of property and wealth, not the reorganization of production.

Communist participation in the land reforms must be understood as a part of their political program, not as a part of their social program of "building socialism." The overriding concern of the East European Communist Parties in the post-war period was not the shape of the future economy, but the assumption of the political power. The Communists offered no opposition to the implementation of the reforms, and, in most cases, expedited them to curry favor with the population. The Communists attuned themselves to the popular mood, carefully concealing the focal point of their operations, which lay in the day-to-day process of consolidating power in the State apparatus, particularly in the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Agriculture. To this end they worked, often obscurely, in minority positions, in the post-war governing coalitions and supported land programs which actually impeded their own subsequent collectivization drives.

The Communists went so far as to support, on countless occasions, the principle of private property. Thus, in 1945, the Hungarian Communist theoretician, Josef Revai, stated categorically: "There exists a material community of interest between the peasantry and labor: the preservation of the distributed land."[16] And two months later Matyas Rakosi echoed his words, declaring, "We do not want kolkhozes, but strong and prospering small farms."[17] And an organ of the Polish Communists, *Glos Ludu*, expressed itself very clearly in the same year:

> The development of the village economy can not and will not be a copy of the Russian development. Our conditions are different; our national traditions are different as well. The difference is in the psychology of the Pole, and without doubt our Polish way of progress will be different.[18]

The Substance of the Reforms

Assured of full Communist support, the reforms were rapidly implemented throughout the region. The most radical land alterations occurred in Hungary, where the land structure had been least

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[16] *Szabad Nep*, August 18, 1945.
[17] *Szabad Nep*, October 16, 1945.
[18] *Glos Ludu*, December 18, 1945.

493 to treat the growing economic disproportions as an *aberration* of
185 the Plans, or at least of the intention of the Plans, or an unfortunate and inexplicable oversight, Nagy clearly assigned responsibility for the failure to the leadership itself. Bierut and Gheorghiu-Dej phrased their announcements of the New Course in such a way as to hint that the agricultural failure had been the result of official policy, but they hedged considerably. The extremely critical economic situation in Hungary of 1953 forced Nagy to treat the past policy with a frankness which was not as apparent elsewhere. But despite the reticence elsewhere, it was clear that the growing disproportions were the result of deliberate Communist application, with slight variations, of the formula stated by Zapotocky in 1949.

● 665 The most striking proof of the secondary role which agricultural development played in Eastern Europe is the general weakness of the Communist political apparatus in the countryside. In this respect East European Communists followed closely in the Soviet footsteps, where approximately 85 per cent of the kolkhozes were without a Party organization in 1949.[23] In Poland, Jacob Berman admitted, 43 per cent of the *villages* were without a Party organization altogether,[24] and elsewhere in the block the situation was no better.[25]

The absence of strong and viable Party units in the countryside reflects the unwillingness of the Communist leadership to assign its best technical and administrative personnel outside heavy industry, as well as the natural gravitation of rising bureaucrats—many of them, after all, drawn from the countryside itself—to the comforts of city life. Throughout the Soviet sphere the composition of the Communist Parties has become increasingly identified with the new managerial bureaucracy and, consequently, the Party units tend to exist in those places where the concentration of technicians is greatest.

This partly explains why implementation of the New Course in 1953-54 has made it imperative that the Party organizations in the countryside be strengthened. The East European regimes have

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[23] Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Cambridge, 1953), p. 454. Fainsod also notes that only 17.7 per cent of the Party members in the predominantly agricultural Ukraine were engaged in agricultural pursuits.

[24] *Trybuna Ludu*, November 6, 1953.

[25] See the speeches of the Czechoslovak Minister of Agriculture, Jindrich Uher (*Rude Pravo*, December 19, 1953), and the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture, Andras Hegedus (*Szabad Nep*, December 31, 1953).

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THE EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES HAVE

brought great pressure to bear upon the urban technicians to go to the villages to improve the technical facilities available for the farms; and simultaneously, strenuous efforts have been made to strengthen the Party organization in the villages. "The situation cannot be tolerated," complained the Hungarian Party organ, *Szabad Nep* in December 1953, "in which skilled and well-educated agricultural experts work in agriculture only in small numbers, and the greater part is engaged in administrative work."[26]

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The administrative weakness of the State in the countryside was also evident from the inferior quality of the personnel employed in rural posts. "Not one of the managers of the Machine and Tractor Stations," the Czechoslovak Minister of Agriculture, Jindrich Uher, revealed, "has a higher-school education and only 3.5 per cent have had a secondary education." Moreover, only 10 per cent of the senior agronomists at the MTS had a higher education, and only three per cent of the State Farm workers had completed work at technical schools.[27] Such were conditions in the most modernized of the Satellite nations; undoubtedly, they were much worse elsewhere.

In Poland, for example, an official analysis, based on "incomplete data," revealed that in its 402 Machine and Tractor Stations there were 76 directors, 72 political leaders, 101 senior agronomists, and 101 senior mechanics who had no qualifications for their jobs whatsoever![28] No doubt it was this wretched situation which explains the recent feverish efforts of the Polish Government to train vast numbers of agricultural experts for immediate service as part of its New Course for Agriculture.

But even if the Communists succeed in increasing the output of farm technicians, two serious problems inherent in the system remain. First of all, there is the tendency of these technicians to attach themselves to the central ministerial apparatus from which so much wealth and prestige is derived in the totalitarian state. Secondly, the technicians who have been dispatched to the countryside are burdened with a host of responsibilities unrelated to the task for which they were trained – that is, the endless paper work of Communist bureaucracy. Resolutions, orders, decrees, receipts, dossiers follow each other in an endless succession, requiring immense expenditure of time and effort, and multiplying as the farm

[26] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), December 4, 1953.
[27] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 19, 1953.
[28] *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), January, 1954, p. 73.

666 369 463 apparatus grows. When the introduction of the New Course in 1953 made agricultural improvement imperative, the seriousness of this bureaucratic delay and confusion became the subject of frequent attack by Communist orators, confirming the judgment of a prominent American student of Communist agricultural life who wrote:

> When you read . . . of the remarkable increase in the number of agronomists and other agricultural specialists and technicians in the Soviet Union, remember that many of them are not engaged, or do not spend much of their time, in research or extension or other technical work, but are trying to cope with the vast amount of bureaucratic paper work required by the Soviet system.[29]

The recurrent drives to "deflate the ranks of the farm bureaucracy" have not generally, according to this same expert, proved successful.

407 241 An additional measure of the long-standing Communist reluctance to divert national resources to agricultural development is to be found in the relatively lethargic pace of farm mechanization. While it is true (see Table 23) that an increase in the mechanization of the "Socialist sector" did accompany collectivization, the increase was by no means as great as popularly pictured, and was not even as great, proportionally, as the increase which accompanied Soviet collectivization in the early thirties. Since one of the stock justifications of large-scale collectivized farming was, and remains, its alleged capacity to exploit modern farm machinery, the failure of the Communists to supply the farms with adequate machinery indicated the degree to which this Communist argument was a rationalization for a policy of exploitation.

Since the broad Russian plains are more adaptable to use of farm machinery, especially large tractors and combines, comparisons with Eastern Europe and its more broken terrain are not altogether apt. However, it should be noted that the Soviet Union provides a higher proportion of tractors to its farms than do the East European Communist regimes. As indicated in Table 23, there were approximately 107,500 tractors in service in Eastern Europe in 1952-53, compared with approximately 45,000 four years earlier. During the four years of collectivization, then, the tractor park in Eastern Europe was increased by only 62,500. In the USSR, on the other hand, over 100,000 tractors were produced in the year 1936 alone,[30] far fewer than was needed, but far greater proprotionately than in Eastern Europe.

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[29] Lazar Volin, "Russia's 'Agricultural Potential,'" *Foreign Agriculture*, October, 1953, p. 179.
[30] Harry Schwartz, p. 243.

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Brigadier-General on the anti-Soviet Front in 1941, who received the Knight Cross of the Iron Cross from Hitler, was, after joining the Communist Party, considered 'loyal' enough to be appointed Minister of War!

The enthusiasm of the Communist Party for 'law and order' is illustrated by their ardour for the monarchy. On November 3rd, 1946, Premier Groza declared: 'The King, the Church, the Army, the People and the Government are one'. A few days later, at a meeting of the Communist-controlled Front organisation, the National Democratic Bloc, Vice-Premier Tătărescu said: 'From Gheorghiu Dej (leader of the Communist Party—Y.G.) to myself we shall all fight together for the consolidation of the Monarchy, because we are convinced that the King is the strongest factor that rallies all Rumanians. We shall fight for the consolidation of the National Church and of private property, the source of all creative enterprise'. (*East Europe*, an informative London weekly, 13th November, 1946). On November 8th, King Michael's birthday, the Communist daily *Era Noua* said: 'The people of Rumania have faith in their King.' (*East Europe*, 20th November, 1946). In the election demonstrations of the National Democratic Bloc, a constantly repeated slogan was 'Trăiască Regele!'—'Long live the King!' On 17th November, 1946, at an army electoral meeting in Bucharest, Gheorghiu Dej concluded his speech appealing for a vote for the 'King's Government': 'Long live the King!' 'Long live his commanders and soldiers! Long live the Army which is his and the people's!' The monarchist enthusiasm of the Communist Party reached such heights that they attacked the Peasant Party leader, Maniu as . . . anti-monarchist. Thus *Era Noua* of December 3rd, 1946, referring to the withdrawal of Maniu and his followers from parliament, suggested that 'in fact, Maniu's unparliamentary attitude is only a guise for his anti-dynastic policy. Maniu has already tried his first obstructive move in King Michael's reign . . . Neither Ferdinand nor King Carol were exempt from Maniu's political tactics'! (*East Europe*, 18th December, 1946). To crown the hypocrisy of the leaders of the Communist Party, on November 8th, 1947, their paper, *Scanteia*, wrote: 'The people wish to His Majesty the King a long life, good health, and a reign rich in democratic achievements' (*The New York Times*, November 9th,

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642 1947). A few weeks later the Communist leaders compelled
662 Michael to abdicate (30th December).
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Hungary

642 The policy of the Communist Party in Hungary in the first
728 stage of Russian intervention was similar to their policy in
471 Rumania and it is therefore unnecessary to describe it in detail.[1] The following quotation from the report of Nagy Imre, a member of the Political Bureau of the Party, to its congress in September, 1946, is typical of many declarations: 'While the war was still being fought, we have determined, and this is one of the basic principles, that in Hungary this is not the time for transition from capitalism to socialism, for struggle between the two social systems, but for uprooting the powerful remants of feudalism. It is not a question then of struggle between the two social systems but of the struggle between democracy and reaction within capitalism.'

The connection between this policy and Russia's interest in gaining control of the Hungarian economy (through mixed companies) and in extorting reparations from her, has already been described.[2] Here it is only necessary to repeat that for three years the Communist Party leaders continued to harp upon the same theme, that they were against abandoning the capitalist structure of the country.

[1] [See category 116, pp. 136-141 -- Analyst]

[2] [See category 116, pp. 60-62 -- Analyst]

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CHAPTER IV

THE COMMUNISTS TAKE CONTROL OF POLICE AND ARMY

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AT THE END of the war, the Communist Parties were participating in governments with bourgeois parties not only in the 'Peoples Democracies,' but in France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Finland. For about two years the Communist leaders called for 'national unity' and 'order' against strikes and workers' struggles in general. In France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Finland, at the end of the honeymoon period, the Communist Party representatives left the governments or were thrown out of them and went over to the opposition, while in the 'Peoples Democracies' they took full control into their hands. This difference was due to the fact that the Communist Party did not take control of the police and army in any of the Western European countries as they did in the East. In none of the first group of countries did the Communists succeed in getting control of the Ministry of War and only in Austria and Finland did they for a time hold the portfolio of Minister of the Interior and hence control of the police. Even in Finland they did not completely succeed in 'purging' the police of 'unreliable' elements and introducing their agents, so that when the Communist Minister of the Interior—Leino—lost his position in the government, his power to use the police as a means of resistance was very limited.

The situation in all the satellite states was very different. Almost from the beginning, the Ministers of the Interior were Communists. They used their positions to recruit the old police officers into the Communist Party, or to replace them by new Communist Party members. As there are, of course, no statistics to show the changes in the party composition of the police in these countries, one can only rely for information on fragments of news in the press. However, in the case of Czechoslovakia there is the evidence of Hubert Ripka, who was the

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CHAPTER V

LIQUIDATION OF THE PEASANT PARTIES

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665 A VERY SEVERE and prolonged struggle took place between the Communist Parties and the Peasant Parties. The latter were neither as black as the Communist leaders painted them, nor as white as the majority of the western capitalist press tried to represent them. The peasant parties were of very diverse character and each of them was far from being homogeneous. Progressive and reactionary, democratic and totalitarian elements were mingled in the same parties. To follow the Communist Party policy towards them it is necessary first to understand the complex character of the peasant parties.

665 565 471 Since the economic, cultural and political leadership of a country rests with the towns, and since the peasants of Eastern Europe were dispersed in small, isolated villages, the leadership of the peasant parties mainly came from the towns. The urban population was divided into conflicting social and political groups, and so the question always arose of which class the peasantry would make its ally—the urban bourgeoisie or the workers' parties. The peasantry is divided amongst itself, the rich peasants naturally looking to one camp, and the poor, semi-proletarian majority, to the other. A whole series of socio-political problems is bound up with this. So long as the big estates were not divided up, the peasantry as a whole remained united in the fight for land reform. and their party had a more or less revolutionary character. But with the carrying out of large-scale land reforms after World War I in Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (see pages 13-8), there was very little to hold the peasantry together and no common political platform. Another factor must be taken into account. For centuries, the peasants in many countries, as for instance in France at the time of the Great Revolution, wanted to get rid of

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their feudal overlords, take possession of their lands and thus gain the freedom to produce for themselves and sell their products in the towns. Such a programme would have been quite inadequate for the East European countries in the period between the two wars, because of the catastrophic fall in agricultural prices as a result of the world crisis and of the great agricultural over-population. The solution of the problems of the peasantry today is not in land distribution alone, but also in industrialisation which will absorb the surplus agricultural population and open up wide markets for agricultural products. There is a contradiction, at least temporarily, between these two factors and different layers of the peasantry have different attitudes towards industrialisation as well as towards the policy of keeping agricultural prices high (by tariffs).

The poor peasants who need to work at least partly for wages and do not produce enough food even for their own needs, have an interest in industrialisation and low prices for agricultural goods, while the rich peasants who want cheap labour do not care about industrialisation and support any policy which results in a rise in the cost of food. Large scale industrialisation is impossible under present conditions in Eastern Europe without State planning, so that the poor peasant naturally tends to support the socialist forces of the towns while the rich peasant looks in quite a different direction for leadership. After the land reform and in face of widespread unemployment, open and hidden, the rich peasants could not propose any positive programme to rally the mass of the peasantry to their side. Another factor contributed to the bankruptcy of the Peasant Parties of Eastern Europe. While on the whole they favoured democracy, the market for the agricultural products of Eastern Europe in the thirties was mainly fascist Germany. Hence the attitude of many of the leaders of the peasant parties to the pro-German policy of their governments was ambiguous, to say the least. To add to the contradictions in which many of the peasant parties found themselves, was the national question which the conservatism and narrow outlook of the peasantry, especially of its rich and well-satisfied section, precluded them from tackling. In Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia this factor was of the utmost importance in leading the official peasant parties into a blind

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665 alley. If any of the peasant parties succeeded at all in escaping
565 control by the wealthy townsmen or by the rich peasants,
471 capitulation to their semi-fascist government, entanglement in a hopeless and reactionary fight against other nations, as the peasant parties of Poland and Bulgaria did to a large extent, and the terrorism of the government rendered them powerless. Unlike the workers' parties, the peasant parties were loose organisations of widely scattered individuals with the control of the organisation concentrated in a few hands (in the towns) and so they were an easy target for the police.

665 Some facts about the peasant parties in East Europe before the end of World War II will illustrate these generalisations.

The Rumanian National Peasant Party came into being in 1926 by the fusion of the chauvinist, anti-Hungarian National Party of Transylvania led by Maniu, and the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom of Rumania led by Ion Mihalache. The Party was led entirely by lawyers, journalists, etc.,and a small group of rich peasants. For years it was sharply opposed to the dictatorial King, and there were frequent and bloody clashes with the fascist organisations and the police. But a party under the leadership of rich peasants and their urban allies in a country where eighty per cent of the population was poverty-stricken could never consistently pursue a democratic policy. During his short periods of office between the two world wars, Maniu ruthlessly suppressed the strikes of the miners and railway workers in 1929 and 1933. Although he had been for years one of the leaders of the democratic opposition to King Carol and his agents, yet at a time when there were armed conflicts between the peasant members of his own party and the Iron Guard fascists, Maniu suddenly in 1937 declared an election pact with the Iron Guard, simply as a tactical manoeuvre against his old opponent Tătărescu and after the assassination of the Iron Guard leader, Codreanu, by the King, Maniu offered a refuge in his party to the Iron Guardists. The Peasant Party behaved with extreme brutality towards the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. During the 1930's when democracy in Rumania was reduced to a sham and when the dictatorship became increasingly open and brutal and millions were looking to Maniu for a call to rebel, he went no further than to writing some articles of protest in the press.

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During the German-Soviet war, he supported the alliance of Marshal Antonescu with Germany. It was only after the Rumanian army reached the Dniester (the pre-war border of Rumania which Russia had violated by annexing Bessarabia—in which Rumanians constituted the majority—in 1940 and which many Rumanians still claimed as the boundary of Rumania) that Maniu called on Antonescu to stop the war. But he was content with publishing 'open letters' to Antonescu and made no appeal to the people for action. 665

The Croat Peasant Party under the leadership of Stepan Radić, and after his assassination, of Vladko Maček, had mass support, but the national question proved to be its Achilles heel. After the land reform in Croatia, the leadership of the Party was in the hands of rich people who were generally nationalistic and opposed to Belgrade. Most of the nationalist bourgeoisie of Croatia also joined the Party. Hence in the words of H. Seton-Watson: 'Originally a social revolutionary movement, the party became a nationalist organisation directed by the urban middle class'. (*Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918–1941*, Cambridge University Press, 1945, p. 227).* The Party became more and more chauvinistic and anti-Serbian in its propaganda, and when in 1941 the quisling Croat Pavelić massacred the Serbs, many of the leaders of the Croat Peasant Party collaborated with him. The Party as a whole, if not collaborationist, was at least a passive spectator of the German occupation.

The record of the Serbian Peasant Party was no better, but as it never had such a mass influence and revolutionary character it had a lower level from which to decline. H. Seton-Watson describes it in these words: 'It had its full complement of business men, small-town traders, urban intellectuals and public officials. It was a party of the peasantry only in the sense that it relied on peasant votes, and that its leaders possessed proficiency in a style of tavern oratory which commended itself to some, but increasingly few, peasants'. (Ibid. p. 241).

The Smallholders' Party of Hungary, headed by Tibor Eckhardt in the days of Horthy and later by Ferenc Nagy, had

*H. Seton-Watson's is by far the most objective and profound study of the politics of Eastern Europe between the two world wars that has been written, and I am very much indebted to it.

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an even worse record than the National Peasant Party of Rumania. Eckhardt himself took an active part in the White Terror against workers, peasants, communists, socialists and liberals, after the downfall of Béla Kun's Government (1919). For years he and his supporters clamoured for a revision of Hungary's frontiers at the expense of Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. During the war, Eckhardt appeared in America and led an agitation for the restoration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire ruled by the Hapsburg dynasty. The Smallholders' Party was a rich peasants' party par excellence, not concerned to defend the poor and oppressed amongst the peasantry. On the contrary, it willingly collaborated with the Horthy regime in stifling any peasant resistance.

Between the wars the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party was so completely controlled by the rural and urban rich that it became the most important party of the ruling bourgeoisie which directed the state.

The two mass peasant parties in Poland and Bulgaria were of a somewhat different character. The peasant movement in Poland was split into three groups: on the right there was the conservative wing, Piast, and on the left there were the two organisations Wyzwolenie and Stronnictwo Chłopskie. In face of the strengthening dictatorship of Pilsudski the three organisations united in 1931 into one called Stronnictwo Ludowe (S.L.) The world economic crisis drove the members of the Stronnictwo Ludowe to more and more radical demands: the partition of all the large estates, the strengthening of the peasant co-operatives, drastic cuts in taxation and improvement of social services. The party co-operated with the Polish Socialist Party, which at that time was leading struggles with wide popular support against the Government of the Colonels and against the ruling classes generally. The co-operation between the Stronnictwo Ludowe and the P.P.S. reached its climax in the mass ten days' peasant strike of August, 1937, against the government, a strike in which the workers in many big towns joined as an expression of their solidarity. The police suppressed the strikes, killing many strikers (officially the casualties were 42 but actually they were much greater), and wounding an even greater number. There can be

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little doubt that if war had not threatened, the stuggles of the peasants and workers would have resulted in the overthrow of the dictatorial regime. 666

In Bulgaria the peasant party—the Agrarian Union—took many years to recover from the overthrow of Stamboliisky in 1923. The majority of its leaders were either assassinated or forced into exile and it was not until 1933 that the government, in response to popular pressure, allowed the uncompromising Agrarian leaders to return. Opposition developed between the right wing Agrarian leaders such as Dimiter Gitchev and Alexander Obbov who were ready to collaborate with the Government, and the left wing Agrarians, the most important of whom were G. M. Dimitrov and Nikola Petkov. Because of their radicalism, these two were called 'fellow-travellers' of the Communist Party. The *Central European Observer* of 12th January, 1945, wrote of their party that it 'has always made friendship with Russia and Yugoslavia its chief aim.' (See also *International Press Correspondence* of November 13th, 1937, praising G. M. Dimitrov as the leader of the left wing of the Agrarian League, the 'Pladne' group, called after its paper).*

There were two other very small radical peasant groups, the Hugarian 'village explorers' (now united in the National Peasant Party) and the Rumanian Ploughmen's Front.

Without taking into account the internal contradiction in the peasant parties between their progressive, democratic and reactionary chauvinistic elements and the consequent splits, it is impossible to understand how the Communist Parties destroyed such big movements so easily and quickly.

An important feature of the Communist Party policy towards the peasant parties was that of 'divide and rule.' They split each peasant party into different wings, so that they could play one off against the other. The Communists did not necessarily co-operate with the more progressive and democratic group against the other. Their policy was determined solely by expediency and not principle. For instance, in Bulgaria, 661

*Ten years later the Communist-controlled Agrarian Union paper, *Zemedelsko Zname* wrote: Nikola Petkov 'In 1931 belonged to the agrarian "Pladne" group, whose connections with foreign reactionary circles were all too well known.' (Quoted in *Free Bulgaria*, 1st October, 1947). It seems it was only to *International Press Correspondence* that this was not well known.

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CHAPTER VI

THE LIQUIDATION OF THE SOCIALIST PARTIES

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BEFORE THEIR LIQUIDATION by the Communist Parties, the different Socialist Parties of Eastern Europe varied greatly in strength, both absolutely and relatively to the national Communist Parties. The Polish Socialist Party was incomparably stronger than its Communist rival; the Hungarian Socialist Party was much stronger than the Communist Party; in Rumania they were of about equal strength; in Czechoslovakia the Socialist Party was much weaker than the Communist Party and in Bulgaria it was weaker still; in Yugoslavia a Socialist Party scarcely existed. It is, therefore, most instructive to examine in detail the fight of Moscow against the Polish Socialist Party, while referring only briefly to the fate of the Socialist Parties in the other countries.

For various reasons the Communist Party of Poland (K.P.P.) was never as strong as the Socialist Party (P.P.S.) The forerunner of the K.P.P. was the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.K.P.i.L.) whose founder and teacher was Rosa Luxemburg. This great Marxist thinker had one very mistaken conception which proved to be a serious impediment to the Polish Party, this was her opposition to any fight for Poland's independence from Russia, Germany and Austria. The ill-fated invasion of the Red Army in 1920 further convinced the masses that the K.P.P. was indifferent to Poland's independence. Karl Radek, who knew Poland well, told the Bolshevik leaders that the Red Army's advance on Warsaw would only isolate the K.P.P. and advised against it. Although he was supported by Trotsky, his warning was ignored by the Bolshevik Party leadership. This was an important cause of the failure of the K.P.P. to gain the support of the majority of the Polish workers. Since the S.D.K.P.i.L.

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was older than the Russian Social Democracy, and hence older than the Bolshevik Party which was originally a faction of the Russian Social Democracy, it had traditions of independent thought that inevitably clashed with the rising absolutist bureaucracy in Russia. In 1923 the majority of the Central Committee of the K.P.P. supported Trotsky against Stalin in the internal Party fight, and after his triumph, Stalin liquidated the Luxemburgist-Trotskyist leadership. Later he had to liquidate the supporters of Bukharin, the President of the Comintern. Later still even the new leadership of the K.P.P. appointed in 1930, did not conform to the 'Line' and had to be liquidated. As Poland lay on the Russian border and the K.P.P. was illegal, the most important leaders of the Party were usually in U.S.S.R., and were thus involved in the big purges of the thirties. Many of them were executed or perished in forced labour camps—Domski, Sofia Unschlicht, Warski-Warszawski, Kostrzewa-Koszutska, Prochniak, Huberman (brother of the violinist), Winiarski, Sochacki, Lenski, Rval, Zarski, Wandurski and Jasienski. (For full details of the fate of the Polish Communist leaders in Russia see the article of P. Olchovski in *Narodnaya Pravda,* Paris, September, 1950). Apparently the purge so decimated the K.P.P. leadership that the Russians found it necessary officially to dissolve the Party (1938). (Their excuse that a large number of police spies had infiltrated into the Party would have been a reason for reorganising, not abolishing it). Shortly after the liquidation of the K.P.P. an event occurred which made any Kremlin supporter hateful to the Poles—the Stalin-Hitler Pact which laid Poland open to invasion. No Pole could forget Molotov's glee when he said before the Supreme Soviet on October 31st, 1939: 'Instead of the enmity that was fostered in every way by certain European powers, we now have a rapprochement and the establishment of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany . . . One swift blow to Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing was left of the ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty . . . ' Nor could any Pole forget or forgive Molotov's message to the German ambassador in Moscow at the end of the invasion of Poland by Germany and Russia: 'I have received your communication regarding the entry of German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations

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and greetings to the German Reich Government. Molotov.' (R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie, editors, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41*. Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, U.S. Department of State, Washington, 1948, p. 89). Or: 'Today our relations with the German State are based on friendly relations, on our readiness to support Germany's efforts for peace ...' (Speech by Molotov on October 31st, 1939, *Soviet Peace Policy*, London, 1941, p. 33). Nor could any Pole forget how the responsibility for starting the German-Polish war was put on Poland. The *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* (1941 edition) wrote: '... in autumn 1939, the unwise leaders of a landlord *Poland*, ordered by Anglo-French imperialists, *started the war against Germany*.' (My emphasis).

Looking ahead to the time when Poland would be a Russian province the Kremlin decided in 1942 to establish a party for Poland, but in order to conceal its connections with the past, it was called the Polish Workers' Party (P.P.R.) instead of the Communist Party of Poland.

As we have seen, Russia allowed the Warsaw uprising to be crushed by the Nazis, because of the weakness of the Party among the insurgents. This, of course, further weakened it.

The position of the P.P.S.[1] was very different. Between the two world wars it enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of the Polish workers. On the eve of the war it led the general strikes in Cracow, Tarnow and other towns and supported the peasants' strike (August, 1937). The municipal elections of 1938 and 1939 resulted in a crushing defeat for the Government and victory for the P.P.S. There can be no disagreement with the evaluation of the election results by the P.P.S. leader Adam Ciolkosz, that 'were it not for the threat of the German invasion they would have a far-reaching result, similar to that of the municipal elections in Spain in 1931.' (Introduction to C. Poznanski, *The Flaming Border*, London, 1944). The left wing of the P.P.S. was so strengthened in the thirties that the Party included in its new official programme adopted at the Radom Congress, February, 1937) the slogan of social revolution and dictatorship of the toiling masses. Unlike the Kremlin, the P.P.S. did not identify the rule of the proletariat with a one-party system, but with consistent democracy.

[1] [The Socialist Party -- Analyst]

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General Secretary of the Polish T.U.C. and editor of its paper. He too was a leader of the resistance movement during the war, and in spite of Osubka-Morawski and the P.P.R. was elected chairman of the Warsaw official P.P.S. Council in 1945 by the members of the Warsaw branch of the official P.P.S. After leaving the official P.P.S., he was arrested and was eventually murdered in prison. Cohn, another leader of the P.P.S., who was for six years in a German prisoner-of-war camp, was once more imprisoned. The same fate has befallen Antoni Pajdak, Tadeusz Szturm de Sztrem, Josef Dziegielewski, Wiktor Krawczyk, Wladyslaw Wilczynski, Stanislaw Sobolewski, Adam Obarski, Boleslaw Galaj and others. One of the most popular P.P.S. leaders was Zygmunt Zulawski, leader of the Party for forty years, for many years the chairman of its Supreme Council and General Secretary of the T.U.C. To keep up the appearance of democracy, the P.P.R. leaders allowed him to become a member of Parliament while preventing all his friends from standing for election as Independent Socialists. Single handed he fought a bitter struggle till his death in September 1949.

But even after the elimination of the real P.P.S., the official P.P.S. was a threat to the P.P.R., since of the two, the Polish workers preferred the former. For example, in 63 elections to shop committees held at the end of 1945 in the largest industrial district of Poland, out of a total of 928 seats the P.P.R. gained only 193 (21 per cent) while the Socialists gained 556 (64 per cent); the rest were divided thus: official trade union common lists of P.P.S. and P.P.R., 117 (12.6 per cent); Democratic Party, 14; Christian Labour Party, 10; Polish Peasant Party, 2; others (non-party), 36.* In many cases even members of the P.P.R. did not vote for their Party lists in the shop committee elections. This is clear from the complaint made on December 8th, 1945, by Gomulka, then General Secretary of the P.P.R.: 'There were elections to the Shop Committee of the "Fablok" factory (in Cracow). Our Party cell in that factory comprises 250—270 people. And in these elections we have not gained a single seat'. If people join a party from fear of being victimised, they will take the first opportunity of showing their real attitude to it.

*For particulars see *Robotnik Polski*, London, January, 1946.

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In spite of the pressure exerted at the November, 1945, Congress of the T.U.C., the P.P.S. had the support of two thirds of all the delegates, and Kazimierz Rusinek of the pre-war P.P.S. was elected General Secretary of the new Central Committee of the Trade Unions.

The workers' support for the official P.P.S. had its effect on the Party's leaders. When at the regional conferences of the P.P.S. in Cracow, Katowice and other towns there was almost unanimous opposition to fusion with the P.P.R. or even to a united front at the elections against Mikolajczyk's party (P.S.L.), even Osubka-Morawski had to support this policy, although of course with reservations. On August 6th, 1946, he wrote in *Robotnik*: 'It seems to me that the greatest difficulties (in the maintenance of a united front—Y.G.) arise from the fact that one partner operates too much under the slogan of "the leading party" . . . A united front may not be based on the principle that the one rules, while the other subordinates himself, that the one lays down the conditions while the other submissively nods his head . . .' Two days later the P.P.R. daily *Glos Ludu* countered this by implying that the 'difficulties' to which Osubka referred were, at least in part, due to 'elements inimical to democracy' in the P.P.S. (Quoted in the article 'The fate of Polish Socialism,' by R. in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1949). A few weeks later, on August 29th, the P.P.S. and P.P.R. leaders were called to Moscow to discuss the question of the United Front. This meeting was followed by another, and at last on November 28th, 1946, the P.P.S. leadership yielded to the pressure of the Kremlin. It seems that the fate of Puzak, Pajdak and the others impressed Osubka even more than the pressure from the rank and file of his own party.

But the P.P.R. leaders nevertheless did not forget Osubka's temerity in writing as he did on 6th August, 1946, and immediately after the victory of the 'united front' in the sham elections of 19th January, 1947, he was removed from the Prime Ministership and from being Chairman of the P.P.S. Central Executive and replaced by Jozef Cyrankiewicz.

But the pressure of the rank and file members of the P.P.S. against capitulation to the P.P.R. continued unceasingly. On May Day, in 1947, the P.P.R. strongly urged a fusion of the

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665 two parties. It also acted; in all factories, members of the
661 P.P.S. who opposed fusion began to be 'purged'. On 7th May, Adam Kurylowicz, a member of the P.P.S. who had been General Secretary of the Trade Unions since 1947, and previously, from 1918 to 1939, President of the All-Polish Railway Workers' Union, wrote an article in *Robotnik* called 'The Defence of the Workers against Abuses and Arbitrary Measures', in which he accused the P.P.R. of setting up a regime of terror in the factories. 'From all parts of the country, he wrote, 'fresh reports keep coming of injustices suffered by the workers. The elements alien to the working class behave in arbitrary fashion, and act "like bosses". They fire and hire workers without taking into account the opinion of the workers of the plant, scorning the laws, conquests, and social rights of the workers. A clique of self-seeking politicians is being formed. These new dignitaries have discovered that a party book is more important than technical qualifications'.

The reply to the impertinence of the P.P.S. was a political trial staged by the security police. One of the defendants, accused of membership of W.R.N., 'confessed' that there were 'no actual differences between the W.R.N. and the (official) Socialist Party'. The threat to the official P.P.S. was all too clear, and although the Party Congress of 14–17 December, 1947, did not welcome the P.P.R. call for a merger, the P.P.S. leadership knew that the game was up and on March 17th, 1948, Cyrankiewicz declared that the merger would be carried out. 82,000 members of the P.P.S. out of the total of 800,000 were expelled from the Party and many of the recalcitrant leaders were removed. Kurylowicz was removed from his post as General Secretary of the trade unions and replaced by Tadeusz Cwik, an old Communist Party agent. Rusinek, Osubka-Morawski, Stanislaw Piaskowski, Drobner and another eight members were removed from the Central Executive Committee of the Party and Szwalbe and another eleven members were removed from the Supreme Council (meeting of the P.P.S. National Council, Warsaw, September 18–22, 1948). The whole executive committee of the P.P.S. in Lodz was removed and other local committees followed suit. The heresy-hunting of Gomulka* occurred at the same time, and

* See pp. 281-3.

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this increased the opposition of the rank and file members of the P.P.S. to unity with the dictatorial P.P.R. and also led to more stringent measures against oppositionists. But by December, 1948, the fusion was an accomplished fact and the 'United Polish Workers' Party' (Z.P.P.R.) was born. The quisling Cyrankiewicz said of the Unity Congress: 'This congress is the greatest event in Poland since Kościuszko's rising'. Cyrankiewicz is probably thus aspiring to get from Stalin the Order of Suvorov—the hangman of Kościuszko's rising!

The liquidation of the Socialist Parties in the other satellites followed a roughly similar course. But because these Socialist Parties were relatively weaker than the Polish Socialist Party, their collapse was due not only to police pressure and the presence in some of them of Russian armies, but to the feeling of many of the rank and file members that the parties were not strong enough to stand up to the pressure of the Communist Parties without allying with the bourgeoisie, and yet that such an alliance would be too dangerous, because a victory of the bourgeoisie over the Communist Parties which had the support of the majority of the workers, would lead to a defeat of the workers themselves and a bourgeois terroristic dictatorship, in short to fascism. The members of the P.P.S. felt confident that if it were not for the Russian army of occupation, they could get rid of the Communist Party dictatorship, and suppress any fascist elements. But many socialists in the other satellite countries thought it would be impossible to oppose at one and the same time the Communist Party dictatorship and a nascent fascist dictatorship. Hence there were different tendencies within the Socialist Parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria—on the one hand, the followers of right wing conservative leaders like Károly Peyer, Kosta Lulchev or C. Titel Petrescu, who collaborated with the bourgeois parties, on the other, those who worked with the Communist Party under such leaders as Zdeněk Fierlinger, Árpád Szakasits and Dimitri Neikov.* The third tendency,

*The fate of these 'fellow-travellers' in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria was not better than that of Osubka-Morawski and Co. in Poland. After they had served their purpose they were pushed aside. Fierlinger, who had been given the post of Vice-Premier as a reward for his services in the February coup, was on April 25th, 1950, relegated to the Ministry of Church Affairs. Szakasits on April 24th, resigned his post as President of the Hungarian Republic on the

(cont. overleaf)

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661 favouring an independent socialist policy, which predominated
665 in the P.P.S., was very weak in the other Socialist Parties. The greater the feeling of impotence, the weaker was this wing.

661 The Communist Party leaders did their best to identify every opposition to themselves with resurgent fascism. This was not difficult, as remnants of the fascist bourgeoisie existed and it was always possible either to reveal or invent a fascist plot. The secret police can always keep in reserve some of the 'lunatic' fringe of fascists in order to use them at a suitable moment.

The knowledge that the Kremlin would not abdicate its authority without using all the forces at its disposal, the belief that the people of the satellites themselves could not put up a successful opposition, the conviction that their 'liberation' in a Third World War would mean in reality the destruction of the population and civilization, all these factors contributed to produce a feeling of hopelessness, and hence capitulation.

This was particularly true of the serious and thoughtful workers in the Socialist Parties. The Communist leaders are well aware of this and not only rely on the demonstration of the military strength of the U.S.S.R. but play on the real fear of war.

665 After years of pressure on all sides from Moscow agents of the Kremlin, there is not one Socialist Party today in the whole of Eastern Europe. All of them have been merged with the Communist Parties.

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grounds of ill-health; this looks very much like an excuse as a fortnight later his son-in-law, Deputy Paul Schiffer, was expelled from Parliament. Neikov had better luck; he died on February 16th, 1948. (At the time of his death he held a relatively unimportant position, that of Vice-President of the Presidium of the National Assembly). The fate of other 'fellow-travellers' was also grim. Thus for instance in Hungary György Marosan, Deputy Secretary of the united Party and Minister of Light Industry, disappeared during a visit to Russia (his resignation was announced on August 5, 1950); Istvan Riesz, a former Social Democrat and Minister of Justice, was arrested in June, 1950, and died in prison; Pál Justus, a former Social Democrat and member of the Central Committee of the united Party, was condemned to imprisonment for life at the Rajk Trial. Similar cases from the other 'People's Democracies' can be quoted by the dozen.

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	Germans (%)	Czechs and Slovaks (%)
Independent	21.89	23.81
Tenants	0.40	0.28
Officials and clerks ..	16.60	18.24
Workers	61.11	55.67

467 In 1930 there were 476 thousand Sudeten Germans organised in trade unions. The Executive Committee of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party stated: 'In their worst plight, on the eve of the Munich decision, our Trade Unions could still compare their strength with those of Switzerland, a country with four million inhabitants and with a functioning democracy.' (Introduction to W. Jaksch, *Sudeten Labour and the Sudeten Problem*, London, 1945).

665 The Sudeten Germans had a long socialist tradition, for Sudetenland was one of the first and strongest socialist centres in the Austro-Hungarian empire. It produced a number of the most prominent leaders of the Socialist International, among them Karl Kautsky, Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. As early as 1907, in the general elections, the Social Democratic Party polled 39.4 per cent of the votes in German Bohemia. In the general elections of 1911, it polled more than 40 per cent. In the elections of 1920 it polled 44 per cent of the Sudeten votes. Together with the Communist Party,* for more than a decade it had about half the votes in Sudetenland, which is a much higher proportion than the Social Democrats and Communists could claim among the Czechs, let alone among the Slovaks.

563 The world economic crisis which began in 1929 changed the
464 situation. The industry of Sudetenland, depending as it did mainly on exports, was affected much more severely by the crisis than industry in the rest of the country. The bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia discriminated against German workers when giving employment, and this aggravated an already grave situation. The result was that 'unemployment in the Sudeten districts was at least twice as high as in the Czech interior.' (Jaksch, ibid. p. 17).

464 The great suffering caused by unemployment in Sudeten-
668 land and the existence of full employment just over the border

*An exact calculation of the strength of the Communist Party among the Sudetens is impossible, as the Party was not divided into different national groups.

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political parties which profess liberalism or which, more precisely, adopt only those elements of liberalism which further their own political aims. Regarded in this light, England, where the Liberal Party is the weakest among the principal political parties, would not be a liberal country. Similarly, in France, Italy, and Belgium, liberalism has not been limited to the so-called liberal parties. The situation was the same in the countries of Eastern Europe.

In Czechoslovakia there were only two liberal parties (the National Democrats and the National Socialists), but liberal ideology greatly influenced the Agrarian Party, the Social Democrats and, to a large extent, the Czech Catholics. In Poland, the National Democratic Party was, at first, the only party to accept any of the liberal principles (it endorsed particularly economic liberalism), but the Polish Agrarian and Socialist parties were influenced strongly by liberalism. In Hungary, the Liberal Party was small and without any influence. A similar situation prevailed in Bulgaria, but liberal aspirations for greater freedom and for more civil rights were not limited to members of the Liberal Party. In Rumania, the Liberal Party was very strong, but it was hardly more "liberal" than Maniu's National Peasant Party. In Yugoslavia, the Radicals and the Democrats who found their support chiefly among the Serbians and the Slovene liberals stood for certain principles of political and economic liberalism, but it is a recognized fact that the Croatian and Serbian Agrarians, as well as the Radicals and the Democrats, fought in the name of liberal democracy against dictatorship. In Bulgaria, the Agrarians of Stambolisky represented a party devoted to democratic principles.

The position and influence of liberalism in Eastern Europe is best illustrated by T. G. Masaryk. His own political party was numerically insignificant but Masaryk, as the most prominent liberal in this region, influenced not only the

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665 829 Czechs and the Slovaks, but also neighboring peoples, particularly the Yugoslavs. A large proportion of the Croatian, Serbian, and Slovene politicians from the Yugoslav provinces that had formerly formed a part of Austria-Hungary were educated before the First World War in the school of Masaryk's liberal thought. Among these men was Stjepan Radić, who later was to become leader of the Croatian Peasant Party.

829 565 Liberalism in Eastern Europe, and this is true for other countries as well, cannot be identified only with the so-called middle classes or with supporters of the free enterprise system. The middle classes, with the exception of those in Czechoslovakia and Austria, were not numerically or economically strong or influential. The capitalistic economic order was strongly defended, not only by the liberals, but by pronounced conservatives among whom were those who began to support authoritarian regimes in the 'thirties. The peasants, insofar as they did not adhere politically to parties of the conservative right, were usually very devoted and often even radical supporters of democracy. Similarly, a great number of socialistically oriented workers and intelligentsia, in supporting political democracy, were influenced by ideas of liberalism. Many liberals, usually those belonging to the intelligentsia, were sympathetic to socialistic tendencies. This socialistically-minded liberalism, which had its counterpart in France among the Radical Socialists or the so-called "Independent" Socialists, and in Britain among the British Fabians, was best represented in Czechoslovakia by T. G. Masaryk and his disciple, Eduard Beneš. Both men, although they rejected Marxism, accepted many ideas of the socialistic school of thought. This liberal socialistic orientation was the basis of the Czechoslovakian party of National Socialists whose adherents were chiefly recruited from the small bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, and the workers. The National Socialists endeavored to combine liberal-

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liberalism, was opposed from the start to chauvinistic nationalism. All his life he advocated and pursued, to use his own expression, "European and world politics." He attempted to reach an agreement with Germany as to the problem of the German minority within Czechoslovakia and to solve other nationality problems to the satisfaction of all. He hoped that Czechoslovakia would become another Switzerland.

Kramář, on the other hand, linked Czechoslovakian national interests with Tsarist Russia. He persistently defended the concept of Czechoslovakia as a "national state" in which the Czechoslovakians would be the leading people and minorities would be delegated to a secondary position. His policy was openly anti-German. He envisaged, in the terms of romantic Pan-Slavism, a great Slav federation headed by a "democratic Russia." Viewing the League of Nations and all international institutions with skepticism, he warned the nation to rely on its own strength. Basically, Kramář's theories were defensive. In practice, they would have served as protection against German imperialism.

A similar difference existed in Rumania between the Bratianu brothers, the leaders of the Liberal Party, and Titulescu, the famous Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Titulescu did not belong to any political party, but his philosophy was definitely liberal. Politically, the Bratianu brothers were liberals in the sense that they defended parliamentary freedom against constitutional monarchy and opposed autocratic ambitions of the prince, later King Carol. Economically, they linked liberalism with the interests of the commercial and banking class. They strove to industrialize the country but, at the same time, they barred foreign capital. In this regard, their economic nationalism was most apparent.

Titulescu, unlike the Bratianu brothers, combined his

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genuine patriotism with sincere internationalism. He was an ardent supporter of the League of Nations. He advocated the principle of collective security. He tried to establish better relations with Soviet Russia. It was he who coined the phrase, "the spiritualization of boundaries." However, he was unable to win sufficient following in the ruling circles, and King Carol, who opposed his broad-minded policy, forced him to resign in 1936.

Poland serves as a clear example of the dominance of nationalism over other political and social trends. In the nineteenth century liberalism attracted many of the Poles who were living in exile, especially those in France. Polish liberals worked enthusiastically with Mazzini in the "Young Europe" movement, and many of them took part unselfishly in the revolution of 1848. However, the great national struggle for the liberation and unification of Poland came to assume first place in the interests of all Polish patriots. Roman Dmowski, a prominent Polish statesman, had been devoted to the principles of liberalism in his youth but, during the national political struggle, he became a passionate nationalist of very conservative leanings. After the re-establishment of Polish independence, liberalism strongly influenced certain small Polish groups, for instance the Democratic and Labor Parties. In the latter, the Catholic influence was strongly felt. Ignace Paderewski, the famous pianist, who contributed greatly to the liberation of Poland in the First World War, belonged to the liberals.

The absence of a pronounced liberal trend and tradition in Poland was undoubtedly one of the reasons why Polish democracy, despite the liberal constitution of 1921, succumbed to the nationalistic pressure of Marshal Pilsudski, who established a semidictatorial regime in 1926 which lasted until the fall of Poland in 1939. The principal defenders of Polish democracy were the Agrarian Party, the Socialists, and the Christian Democrats. Naturally, nation-

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alism was strong even in these parties. It must be remembered that even the ardor of Polish Catholicism had its roots in Polish nationalism: Catholicism was a defense against the Eastern Orthodox Russians as well as against the Protestant Prussians.

The Polish National Democratic Party, which represented the middle class and the intelligentsia, became chauvinistic and violently antisemitic in spite of its original liberal aspirations. It fought against Pilsudski's dictatorship more for reasons of power politics than for ideological reasons. From 1930 on, this party inclined, and especially its younger members, more and more towards fascism. Nationalism suppressed the liberal elements of this party almost entirely.

In Poland, where nationalism was more extreme than in the other Eastern European countries, liberalism was limited mostly to certain intellectual groups. One important group had its headquarters at the University of Cracow, with Professor Estreicher as its leader. Liberalism influenced the agrarians and socialists of Poland inasmuch as these groups much preferred democracy to dictatorship.

The case of Poland brings to mind very forcibly a factor which as a rule is not given its due: that is, the dependence of the nations of Eastern Europe upon the other nations of Europe and the rest of the world. The freedom of these nations is dependent on the freedom of all other European nations, including Russia.

It can be said, therefore, that liberalism can prosper in these countries only if the climate of Europe is favorable. As soon as a regime of any of the big powers on the European continent tends towards aggressive expansionism or becomes totalitarian, by definition imperialistic, the liberty of all European nations, great and small, is threatened, and liberalism finds itself in mortal danger.

History clearly proves the accuracy of this analysis. In

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people. All over Eastern Europe the land hunger of the peasants, the low wages of the workers, the great disproportion between the prices of industrial and agricultural products, the periods of unemployment, the practices of totalitarian regimes, the remnants of feudalism, tension between national groups, and intolerance played an important role. Knowing the skill with which the Communists usually exploit economic difficulties, social injustice, and national differences, it would seem that in these countries they would have found much greater support. However, despite conditions favorable to Communist propaganda, both in the countries that had always known Russia as an imperialistic conqueror and in Southeastern Europe where Russia had been considered an ally since the struggle for liberation from Turkey and where religious factors aroused no antagonism, the Communist parties did not attract a very large following before the war.

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Various circumstances explain this fact. Countries at a distance from Russia could not contrast Communist propaganda to Communist reality; they learned of Russia from tours organized by the Intourist or from the study of Communist writings. The peoples of Eastern Europe, on the other hand, caught glimpses of their neighbor even through a tightly closed frontier and observed the immensity of the misery, oppression, and terror that existed in the U.S.S.R. The sudden tactical maneuvers of Lenin and Stalin which often obliged the Communist parties to act against the vital interests of their respective countries further disillusioned Russia's immediate neighbors.

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It is difficult to cite exact figures concerning the Communist parties in Eastern Europe, because they operated under different names at different times and because they sometimes existed legally and sometimes illegally. Let us take for example the Communist Party of Poland. Before the First World War the Communists acted through the So-

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665 cial Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, which party opposed the idea of an independent Poland. During the Bolshevik invasion of Poland in 1920, a Communist government of Poland was created at the rear of the Red Army at a time when the whole Polish nation, united under the leadership of Premier Witos of the Peasant Party and Vice-Premier Daszynski of the Socialist Party, was fighting against the Bolsheviks. In independent Poland after 1921 the Communist Party declared itself in opposition to the independence of Poland and advocated the incorporation of the Republic of Poland into the Soviet Union.

In 1926 the Communists supported Pilsudski's *coup d'état* against the democratic president and government. Only later did they announce that this had been a "mistake of the leadership of the party." When the Comintern attempted to provoke a Communist revolution in Germany in 1932, the Polish Communist Party declared that they favored granting to Germany both Silesia, which had been ceded to Poland after the First World War, and complete control over the Free City of Gdansk (Danzig).

The weakness of the Communist Party of Poland on the eve of the Second World War is proved by the fact that in 1938 it was dissolved by the Comintern on the pretext that it was completely infiltrated by the secret police of the Polish government. After the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact the Polish and German Communists considered the line of division between the German and Soviet spheres of influence to be the future frontier between the Communist Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, Poland, of course, would be completely erased from the map.

648 The Soviet invasion of Poland, undertaken in agreement with Nazi Germany, the incorporation into the Soviet Union of almost half of the eastern territory of Poland, and the deportation of a million and half Poles to Russia were pre-

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sented by the Communists as the liberation of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Lithuanian peoples from the yoke of the Polish landlords; Hitler's war against France and England were presented as a battle against Anglo-Saxon imperialism. After the fall of France the Polish Communists, together with those sent from France, assumed a neutral attitude toward the Nazi occupation and terror in Poland. They did not take part in the underground struggle of the Polish nation. They were tolerated by the Gestapo and moved about freely. Only after Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941 did they regain the "spirit of patriotism" and join the Polish underground struggle against Hitler.

Various events greatly discredited the reputation of the Polish Workers' Party (one of the guises under which the Polish Communists masqueraded during the war years). Such events were the massacre of the Polish war prisoners at Katyn, the death of hundreds of thousands of people deported to Soviet forced labor camps in the years 1939-1941, the deportation in 1944 of over 40,000 members of the underground Home Army who had been fighting against the Germans and aiding the entering Red Army, and the return to Poland of a number of Poles who had experienced the Soviet reality. Further discredit was brought to the Polish Workers' Party by the presence of the Communist Lublin Committee. The Committee seized power in Poland with the aid of the Soviet army and the NKVD and nominated as ministers of the government persons who had been in the German concentration camps and had served the Gestapo faithfully.

According to its reports in 1937, the Communist Party of Poland had 6,000 regular members and 12,000 members in the Communist Association of Polish Youth. Experts are of the opinion, however, that these figures were exaggerated by the leadership of the party which was afraid of presenting to Moscow a true report of the extent of its influence. *New*

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665 *Roads*, the Communist organ published after the war in Warsaw, reported that before the Second World War the Communist Party of Poland never had more than 20,000 [666] members. In the elections for the Seym (the Polish parliament) in 1922, the Communists netted 130,000 votes or 1 per cent of the votes cast. In 1926 the Communists together with their various affiliates had 23 deputies. At the peak of the economic crisis in 1928 the Communists received 829,000 out of 11,758,000 votes, or about 7 per cent of the total number of votes cast. The Communist bloc, by 1946, consisted of the Polish Workers' Party (Communists), the Polish Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, and the Labor Party. This bloc, it was secretly reported to Stalin, did not receive more than 16 per cent of the votes either in the referendum of 1946 or in the elections of 1947, despite the presence of the Red Army in Poland and the use of terror and violence. These few samplings from the history of the Communist Party of Poland show how Communist tactics which required actions against the interests of the country and its various social classes and which contradicted the ideological theories of communism prevented a wider development of the Communist Party.

Czechoslovakia had a genuine democratic system before the war and gave the Communist Party full freedom of action. In the parliamentary election of 1925 the Communists gained 41 seats and in the elections of 1934 and 1935 they received only 30 seats out of the total number of 300 in the parliament. After the war, in May 1946, the Czech Communist Party won 31 per cent of the total Czechoslovakian vote and elected 93 deputies out of the total number of 300. In the same election the Slovak Communist Party, in a region that had already experienced the "blessing" of liberation by the Red Army, won a much smaller percentage of the total vote in proportion to the population.

In Bulgaria, before the Second World War, the number of

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Communist deputies ranged from 15 to 48 out of a total 665 number of 274 members of parliament. The highest Communist representation was gained directly after the First World War and the lowest, consisting of only 15 deputies, occurred under Stambolisky; in 1927 the Communists had 33 deputies. The phenomenon of the political opportunism of all Communist parties during the war, that is, their sudden switch to the support of Hitler, was particularly pronounced in Bulgaria. The political report of the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party of December 1948 shows that in August of 1944, that is, at the moment of the change of government toward the end of the Second World War, the Communist Party had only 25,000 members.

In Hungary, since the experience with Béla Kun in 1919, [666] the influence of communism has been very weak. It is significant that after the Second World War in the elections of 1945 the Hungarian Communists received only 17 per cent of the vote, despite the Russian methods of persuasion. Even in the elections of 1947 the Communists won only 18 per cent of the vote for their own party.

According to the reports of Anna Pauker and other Communist leaders, the Rumanian Communist Party had less than 2,000 members in the years 1944-45.

The Communists could never expect to assume power in any of the above mentioned countries by parliamentary and democratic methods because the Communist parties, even in the most favorable periods, had the support of only 5 to 15 per cent of the people. Neither were the Communists able to establish police systems in these countries in the period immediately following the Second World War. Therefore, they promulgated "People's Democracies." They organized within the individual countries by stealing the traditional names of prewar political parties, by filling the top posts in these parties with their own agents, and by creating fictitious coalitions of parties. The Communists had in their

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665 actions a triple objective: to mislead the people, to prevent the postwar restoration of political parties by their original leaders and members or to break them up if they had been restored already, and to beguile foreign opinion into believing that multiparty systems still existed in the Eastern European countries.

The lack of popular support of the Communist parties is visible even today in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. For this reason, in the last elections in Poland and in Rumania in 1952, and in Hungary in 1953, the lists of candidates, made out completely by the Communists, were presented to the people under the disguise of a "National Front." The National Front is represented as a coalition of political parties, trade unions, youth organizations, scientific societies and so forth, and is highlighted by the names of "patriot-priests" and "progressive Catholics." The Communist press in Poland admits that the institution of the National Front was necessary in the elections of 1952 because in 60 per cent of the voting localities, especially in the villages, there were "white spots," that is, areas where there did not exist a single cell of the Communist Party.

665 177 692 In summary, it can be said that the Communist dictatorship was imposed upon the countries behind the Iron Curtain under the name of People's Democracy through the following means: Moscow's strategic and political machinations during the war; the direct intervention of the Red Army and the NKVD in the internal affairs of these countries both at the end of and after the war; either the falsification of the will of these nations in the elections or the *coup d'état*, as in Hungary in 1947, and in Czechoslovakia in 1948.

665 An analysis of Communist strength clearly shows that the Communists could not have expected in a single case to assume power in a democratic and parliamentary manner. And, it must be added, the peoples of the Eastern Euro-

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pean countries have declared themselves in overwhelming majority to be opposed to the Communist system despite the pressure of the Red Army and of the NKVD. Violence and fraud were the only means by which the Communists were able to seize power in these countries.

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III

In the Soviet Union strict ideological discipline became the order of the day after the wave of patriotic feeling that arose and was encouraged during the Second World War. It was during the period of the revival of this communist ideology that the Communist dictatorships in the captive countries were given the name of People's Democracy. The relation of this new doctrine to the theoretical foundations of the Soviet state should therefore be examined.

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In the Constitution of 1936 the U.S.S.R. is clearly defined as a "socialist state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat" (Articles 1 and 2), and the exclusive role of the Communist Party is explicitly stressed (Articles 3 and 126). Moreover, Stalin himself wrote that "The proletariat needs the Party for the purpose of achieving and maintaining the dictatorship. The Party is an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat." [1] Speaking on the draft of the new constitution in November 1936, he further said: "I must admit that the draft of the new Constitution does preserve the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R." [2]

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Soviet political theory assumes that socialist states must evolve from a phase in which the state continues to be used as an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat to a

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[1] Joseph Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, 11th ed. (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940), p. 80.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 578.

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1947 but not to the years following. The period of the New Economic Policy in Russia was called "the period of a certain revival of capitalism"; in reality, it was a kind of retreat of communism from economic difficulties.

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In the captive countries there was no "period of revival of capitalism." Since the very inception of communism, there has been a systematic liquidation of all private property, carried out in premeditated fashion within the limits of existing conditions and possibilities. In the beginning, the question of private property arose only in regard to small trade, dwelling houses, building, crafts, and, in a larger degree to peasant farming. Hence, the Communists advocated the principle of a three-sector economy, composed of state economy—after an immediate nationalization of medium and heavy industries, landlords' estates, and forests—of cooperative economy, and of private economy.

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The fact that this period, the traces of which we still find in the constitutions of the captive countries, was planned from above as no more than a transitional period, is best proved by the accusation leveled against the former Communist Vice-Premier of Poland, Gomulka, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Warsaw, in 1948. Gomulka was told then that his main guilt was not that he agreed to the principles of the three-sector economy but that he acted according to these principles. It was explained to him then that he had proceeded as though he wanted to keep the system although he knew that it was transitional.

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In 1947, after the falsification of the elections and the destruction of the opposition of the independent peasant parties in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland, the Cominform was established and Communist policy abandoned its nationalist line and adopted the line of internationalism. A special declaration of the differences between Communist internationalism and the "cosmopoli-

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tanism" of the West was introduced, and the Communists vigorously went about the destruction of the remaining private property, the collectivization of agriculture, and the transformation of the remaining independent cooperatives into a sector of the Communist state economy. It was therefore, in theory and practice a period of the establishment of socialist states, ruled by the dictatorship of the proletariat and disguised by the name of People's Democracy. This period was marked by the accelerated tempo of the communization of all spheres of national life, by the integration of the economies of the People's Democracy into the Soviet economy, and by political and legislative preparations for the incorporation of these countries into the Soviet Union.

Analysis of the constitutions imposed upon the captive countries shows that the People's Democracies are dictatorships of the proletariat different in form but not in substance from the Soviet system. No matter when the constitutions of the People's Democracies were imposed or whether there were differences in their wording, the most important provisions are the same in each constitution. More light can be cast on these constitutions by the political circumstances in which they were imposed and by their preambles than by a dry analysis of their provisions.

In Bulgaria in 1946 the Communists falsified the elections, and in 1947 they introduced in the Parliament the draft of a new constitution. According to this draft, the president was still to be the head of the state and not the Chairman of the Presidium of the Parliament as in Soviet Russia. On September 23, 1947, the leader of the opposition, Petkov, was hanged by the Communists, and on December 4, 1947, a revised constitution was imposed upon Bulgaria. This new constitution went further in its provisions than the constitutions imposed several years later in the other captive countries. The office of the president

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to the belief that human language is unable to express the whole truth about the greatest disgrace to mankind that the twentieth century will know—the Soviet forced labor camps.

A sentence to a forced labor camp amounts to a sentence of death because the enormous majority of the inmates in these camps cannot exist under the conditions prevailing there and die before they are released. The inmate of such a camp works beyond his strength, knowing that if his productivity falls his starvation-level food ration will be cut. The instinct for self-preservation urges him to defend himself from death, and his reactions become those of a hungry animal. All his human feelings disappear, even his attitude toward his fellow inmates. Degraded and humiliated as a human being, the prisoner works like an animal for his enemies only to prolong his life by a year or two and then inevitably to perish.

Political freedom does not exist in the Communist countries either under law or in practice. Let us take for example Article 72 of the Polish constitution of July 1952. Similar provisions will be found in all other Communist constitutions. The first lines of Article 72 say that the citizens have the right of political organization, but the third paragraph of the same article says that organization of assemblies and participation in an organization which opposes the political and social system of People's Poland are forbidden. In other words, any party which does not recognize the Communist political system is forbidden, and membership in it is punishable.

Since membership in a political party presupposes some right to influence that party, the question arises whether the Communists find it advisable to allow every citizen to belong to his country's Communist Party. The answer is no. The official statistics of the Communist parties in the occupied countries as well as in the Soviet Union show that the number of members of these parties ranges from 5 to 10 per cent

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of the population of the given country. Finally, even the internal structure of the Communist Party is dictatorial. The delegates of the local organizations accept only the projects and decisions of the party elite or of the chief dictator.

The Rumanian constitution, just like the others, appears to guarantee freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of public processions and manifestations. Article 85 states that "These rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working masses and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites." In practice, the printing presses, paper mills, public buildings, radio, and so forth are owned by the state and are completely controlled by the leadership of the Communist Party. Even religious processions and manifestations require the consent of the state.

In theory, under the Communist system, every citizen over eighteen years of age has the right to vote. In practice, the elections are a tragic farce. They do not mean the right to select a candidate, to participate in the adoption of a party program, or even to defend social or national interests. They signify a compulsion to vote for one's hated enemies. The elector is forced to march to the polls to the accompaniment of music played by his foes while pain wrenches his heart and his fists clench in hatred and anger. The official results of the elections always show that the candidates of the Communist Party have received 99 per cent of the votes.

Does the administration of justice stand guard over civil liberties? No, it definitely does not, either in practice or in theory. The constitutions of the People's Republics have clear provisions in this respect. Article 41 of the Hungarian constitution states: "The courts shall punish the enemies of the people, defend and secure the political, economic and social order of the People's Democracy . . . they shall edu-

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frontiers were another cause for great migrations. Four million Poles moved from the territory which was incorporated into the U.S.S.R., and millions of Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks moved into districts formerly inhabited by the Germans. Although these changes alleviated the problem of rural overpopulation in Eastern Europe, there was still, at the end of the Second World War, a surplus population estimated at nine million.

The Communist parties in various Eastern European states knew very well how to exploit this situation. They knew that it was vital to the success of revolution that the peasantry should not be opposed to it. They knew that the Russian Revolution had been achieved only because Lenin was fully aware of the desire of the peasant for more land.

Orthodox Marxist theory required that the land be nationalized and that it be administered by the state. Land was considered the most important means of production, and it had to be treated as such. This dogma was abandoned by Lenin for tactical reasons. He nationalized land in the Soviet Union during the revolution of 1917, but distributed it under ninety-nine-year leases to small and medium peasants for private exploitation. It was the political pressure of the peasants which forced Lenin to change his political doctrine and implement the agrarian program of the Populists, his political opponents. Lenin and his followers did not approve of the peasant who, according to them, was a relic of the precapitalistic society. It was Lenin's view that "small, individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale," and that in the future classless society the peasant was to assume the status of a worker on the land as his fellow in town was a worker in industry.

Political expediency determined Lenin's change in tactics. He supported small agrarian property holders only because

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ganization did not exist until the Second World War; the organization itself was established after the war by exiled political leaders.

In Slovenia, Slovakia, and Lithuania, on the other hand, truly peasant political organizations have never developed fully. In these Catholic countries the peasantry was influenced from the beginning by the Catholic political thought and subsequently organized on the principles of Christian democracy.

Although the immediate motives for peasant organization in different countries were varied, its demands were everywhere identical because of its common general source—its ideological basis. The programs made the following demands for the peasants: full political rights, proportional participation in public affairs, agrarian reform and distribution of the land to the peasants, social justice, and rights for the peasants in educational facilities equal to the rights of other classes in the state.

To understand better the peasant movements and their aims, three elements of their ideological and organizational structure must be discussed: first, their ideological basis; second, the dogmatic differences between these and other contemporary political and socio-economic trends; and third, the effective points of their practical programs.

The peasant ideology, or peasantism, is the outlook of the peasantry on the complex of political and socio-economic issues in which the peasants are interested and for whose solution they are fighting. The organizational forms of peasantism, established for the purposes of current political struggle, are the various peasant political parties. Unlike scientific socialism or Christian democracy, peasantism is not the artificial creation of an individual or group of individuals; it contains only those ideas which are inherent in the peasant soul and character. Consequently, the peasant leaders do not conceive the political soul of peasantism but merely interpret

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and articulate its principles. Hence, considerable differences must exist between peasantism and other contemporary movements.

Between peasantism and scientific socialism, there are irreconcilable differences, reflected in philosophical, economic, social, and political concepts. Philosophically, scientific socialism advocates economic determinism, dialectic materialism, and the materialistic interpretation of history. Consequently, it repudiates the existence of a superior being, rejects religion and spiritual values as detrimental to human development, and minimizes the significance of tradition. Peasantism, on the contrary, relies on the idealistic principles of philosophical reasoning, stresses the existence of God, points out the necessity for religious beliefs, and indicates the importance of spiritual values. It emphasizes as of equal importance the significance of tradition in human development and reaffirms its position in the peasant society.

Economically, scientific socialism demands the collectivization of the means of production, including land, and the introduction of a planned socialist economy. It evaluates individuals and collective groups exclusively on the basis of their role in socialist production and repudiates economic individualism in any form. Peasantism, on the contrary, defends firmly the principle of private ownership of the means of production, especially of the peasant land, and teaches that the right to dispose of the fruits of one's own labor is sacred and inviolable. It rejects the planned economy of socialism and favors private initiative and the system of free cooperation.

Socially, scientific socialism teaches the necessity of a permanent class struggle and considers as inevitable the revolutionary overthrow of the existing social and economic order by the proletariat. Peasantism, on the contrary, rejects the idea of class struggle and believes in the possibility of a peaceful coexistence of all classes of society. It also rejects

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vention possible. They usually claimed that this intervention was necessary "to save the country from the total chaos in which it was driven by the unsatisfactory operating of democratic institutions." What was even worse, new regimes were supported often by the Western democracies who used the unjustifiable excuse that "no other solutions were possible."

Despite the mistakes and failures of the democratic regimes, today even the most bitter opponents of peasantism must admit that the peasant parties, as political organizations, were stalwart champions of democratic government and did not, in general, support the established dictatorships or their undemocratic methods.

The greatest achievement of all the peasant groups was that of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union. From its modest beginnings in 1896, the Union grew steadily. In the first postwar elections it received a strong relative majority in the National Assembly, and in the elections of April 1923, 212 deputies out of 245 were allotted to the Agrarian Union. At the relatively early date of October 1919, the first Bulgarian peasant government of Aleksander Stambolisky was formed. The most significant of its numerous political and economic achievements was the agrarian reform based on the principles that the land should be the property of those who till it and that every peasant is entitled to only as much land as he and his family are able to cultivate. In spite of the certain weaknesses and deficiencies of this peasant government which contributed to its downfall, its democratic basis cannot be denied. Its reforms converted Bulgaria into a country of small and medium peasant holdings which, despite the forcible overthrow of the peasant regime in June 1923, remained unchanged until the end of the Second World War.

In Czechoslovakia, the Republican Agrarian Party was the strongest party in the Parliament and the most important pillar of the Czechoslovakian democracy. After the political

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665 liberation of the Czechs and the Slovaks in 1918, the party's
642 main goal was to secure economic and social prosperity for the Czech and Slovak peasants, chiefly by promoting cooperative organizations and by defending the interests of the peasant populations. The party averaged forty-five deputies on all national elections and cooperated with other democratic parties in the governments of the Republic. The President of the Party, Antonin Švehla and his successor, Milan Hodža, were for many years Prime Ministers of the Czechoslovakian governments.

665 The Croatian Peasant Party, established in 1904 by the
185 brothers Ante and Stjepan Radić, reached its full political importance in the first postwar elections in Yugoslavia. This was in November 1920, and at that time the party became the undisputed choice of the Croatian people. In all free parliamentary elections since then, the Croatians, and especially the Croatian peasantry, have cast their votes in overwhelming majority for this political group. The principal aims of the party's program were Croatian national independence and social and economic justice. When the president of the party, Stjepan Radić, was assassinated in June 1928, Vladko Maček, who heads the party today, was elected president. In its political struggle, the party has opposed violently the Yugoslav centralism favored by the majority of Serbian political groups, and has been outlawed twice as "dangerous for the interests of the state." In August 1939, a compromise that opened the door for a just settlement of the Serbo-Croatian dispute was reached with the Regency of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and with certain of the Serbian political parties.

The beginnings of the Polish peasant movements date back to 1905, when the first Polish peasant associations were organized in Galicia under the leadership of Wincenty Witos. With this as an initiative, the Polish peasant party, *Piast*, was founded in Cracow in 1913. During the First World War,

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In the Russian part of Poland, another peasant party, *Liberation*, was born. Its leader was Stanislaw Thugutt. This party emphasized the solution of social and economic problems, demanding primarily an extensive land reform and distribution of the land to the peasants. In liberated and united Poland, these two peasant groups united in 1920 to become the strongest individual Polish political group, but later, in May 1923, one faction dissented. Witos was repeatedly elected Prime Minister and was holding this position in 1926 when the military *coup d'état*, executed by Pilsudski, put an end to democratic government in Poland. In 1928, during the dictatorship, all peasant political groups fused in a united peasant party under the leadership of Witos and Mikolajczyk, but, because of the undemocratic regime, this group was never permitted to take part in Poland's political life.

Although it may be argued that the embryonic stage of peasant organization in Serbia started in 1882 under the influence of the socialist ideas of Svetozar Marković, it is more correct to say that the first truly peasant movement in Serbia began in 1905 with the actions of Milislav Kurtović. In 1920, in the new state, Yugoslavia, the Agrarian Union of the Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes was established, under the leadership of Joca Jovanović. The Union had little success among the Croatian and Slovenian peasantry, and was later known as the Serbian Agrarian Party. It recruited its followers mainly from the Serbian peasants in Serbia, Bosnia, and northern Dalmatia. The party was in the difficult position of being obliged to compete politically with two well-established Serbian parties, the Radicals and the Democrats. The provisions of the electoral law were unfavorable to the smaller political formations and, for this reason, the party was hindered from obtaining a proportional number of deputies in national elections. In June 1938, after the death of Joca Jovanović, Milan Gavrilović was elected the new president of the party.

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665 The initiative for a peasant organization in Rumania was
185 given in 1907, in Jassy, Bessarabia, by Constantine Stere,
642 who was influenced by Russian Populism. The Rumanian Peasant Party was formally founded in 1919, and Ion Mihalache was elected its President. In 1926, the Rumanian National Party from Transylvania, led by Iuliu Maniu, and the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom fused into one political group known as the Rumanian National Peasant Party, which became the strongest political organization of the country. In the elections of 1928, the overwhelming majority of votes were cast for this united peasant front, and a peasant government was formed with Maniu as Prime Minister. This party brought about some administrative, economic, and social reforms which aimed at the assurance of the progress of the Rumanian state. Unfortunately, the peasant rule was definitely handicapped by the international agrarian crisis which was at its peak during the period of the peasant government. The party's position was further aggravated by its continuous struggle with the liberals and by numerous intrigues of the Crown calculated to destroy the unity and vigor of the peasant group.

665 Because of specific conditions which existed in Hungary, the organization of the peasantry commenced relatively late. Sandor Czismadia made the first attempt to organize the landless peasants on the principles of agrarian socialism in 1896, but the genuine peasant movement was initiated by István Nagyatádi-Szabó in 1908. The movement grew in strength after the collapse of the first Communist regime of Béla Kun, but its original success and its hopes for the future were skilfully suppressed by the Hungarian ruling class. It was not until 1930 that Zoltan Tildy and Ferenc Nagy undertook the revival of a truly peasant political organization. As a consequence, the Hungarian Smallholders Party was founded. This party fought valiantly against all the odds of the authoritarian Hungarian regime, but was not able to at-

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tain its full strength until after the First World War in the November elections of 1945.

The first international agreement among various peasant groups was reached in 1921, subsequent to the visit of the Bulgarian Premier Stambolisky to Prague. This agreement was between the Bulgarian Agrarian Union and the Czechoslovak Republican Agrarian Party, and was later joined by the Polish Peasant Party. The agreement was, however, of a short duration and of little significance in international relations. In 1923 Stambolisky was overthrown and assassinated, and in 1926 the Prime Minister, Witos, was ousted following the military putsch of Pilsudski.

In 1928 efforts were renewed to achieve an international peasant understanding, and in 1929 the International Agrarian Bureau in Prague was established. The Bureau was presided over by Švehla, and nineteen different peasant organizations from all parts of Europe participated in its work. The Bureau stood for the principles of cooperation, mutual aid, friendship, democracy, and peace. Unfortunately, international conditions did not favor such an association. Except in Czechoslovakia, democratic political movements throughout Eastern Europe were either already outlawed or under heavy pressure of the authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the international agrarian crisis and other unsolved international problems were considerable hindrances to the good will and honest endeavors of the peasant leaders. Nevertheless, the International Agrarian Bureau has contributed considerably to the presentation and defense of the peasant cause in the world. Its activities were discontinued only with the total occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

IV

As might have been expected, the main efforts of the Communists, when they formed the People's Democracies

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665 661 in Eastern Europe, were directed against the peasant political groups. Besides the unbridgeable ideological differences between peasantism and communism, and the proverbial intolerance of the latter, there were specific reasons why the violence of the Communist regimes reached its climax during the suppression of the peasant political opposition.

First, the peasantry forms a substantial majority in the greater part of the area. The Communists are unscrupulous in their methods, but they are not brainless when considering the accomplishment of their targets. They know that the peasantry can be temporarily intimidated but never permanently quashed if it maintains political organizations of its own. Hence, these organizations had to be crushed before the Communists could expect any success.

Second, the peasant parties constituted the strongest democratic force in the area. The totalitarian elements had been destroyed for the most part by the Second World War, but the peasants, who could not be reproached with either collaboration or totalitarianism and could not be labeled as "fascist reactionaries," remained the greatest danger to the Communists—the self-imposed "liberators and people's friends." Hence, these groups had to be liquidated before the Communist power could be effective and its program carried out.

Third, the peasant parties possessed a vigorous program, and nothing infuriates the Communists more than a challenge to their alleged monopoly on the solution of current issues. It is obvious that those who advocate outgrown ideas in a peasant country have little chance for success, but the political platforms of the peasant parties had far more to offer the peasant population than the forcibly implemented, nebulous formulas and strange institutions imported by the Communists. However, in Communist controlled countries

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no alternatives are permitted, and hence, the peasant leaders had to be eliminated. 665 661

In view of the foregoing, it is not surprising that the formal disappearance of genuine peasant political organizations in this region is today an accomplished fact. Various procedures were used to achieve this. In Yugoslavia, the Croatian Peasant Party and the Serbian Agrarian Union were banned, together with all other democratic parties, at the very beginning of the Communist era. Several fake peasant groups were established whose tasks were to support the proletarization of the country and to demonstrate to the outside world that the "progressive and thinking peasantry" greeted the new reforms enthusiastically.

In Czechoslovakia, some political parties were active in the postwar period preceding the Communist coup in February 1948, but the Czechoslovakian Agrarian Party was deliberately banned at the close of the war, and its leaders arrested and tried for alleged collaboration with the Germans. Today it is obvious that these collaboration charges were a skillful maneuver of the Communists to eliminate their most dangerous opponents.

The Agrarian Union in Bulgaria was at first in the coalition government with the Communists, who held the key positions in the army and in the administration. Through direct Soviet intervention and the political violence of the Communists, the Agrarians were first reduced to one third of their actual strength, and subsequently liquidated with the trial of their leader, Petkov, in September 1947.

In Rumania the situation was similar. Hopes for the promised free elections were not realized and, in August 1947, the peasant leaders, Maniu and Mihalache, were sentenced to life imprisonment as "foreign agents and enemies of the people." This meant the end of organized peasant opposition in Rumania. In Poland Mikolajczyk attempted in vain to secure

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665 661 the rights of the Peasant Party, but in the controlled elections of January 1947, the party was reduced to twenty-seven deputies which completely paralyzed it in its further political struggle.

The situation was different in Hungary. In the elections of November 1945, the Hungarian Smallholders Party polled 59 per cent of all the votes and subsequently formed the government under the premiership of Ferenc Nagy. However, only eighteen months later, after numerous Communist plots, the party was crushed, and in subsequent developments it was politically liquidated.

When it became impossible for the peasantry to continue its struggle within the respective countries, the exiled peasant leaders founded the International Peasant Union in Washington, D.C., on July 4th, 1947. The Union, in which all peasant groups are represented, issued a program founded on the basic principles of peasant ideology. Its primary purpose is to interest the democratic West in the peasant struggle and to offer hope to the enslaved peasantry for its eventual liberation.

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000 This brief analysis of peasantism in Eastern Europe is not intended to be a glorification of the peasantry and its movement. The peasants are not a God-chosen group, neither are their leaders without faults and errors. Mistakes have been committed by the peasant parties in the past, and many more may be committed in the future. But who does not err in politics and public affairs? Surely these imperfections are not sufficient reason for disfavoring the peasantry or for rejecting the idea of an active support of peasant political organizations. The purpose of this essay has been to indicate the importance of the peasantry in the struggle of the free world with the Communists.

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chose to keep Yugoslavia intact by refusing to become a mere instrument of Soviet policy. He undoubtedly saw clearly that the Kremlin took no risks and would certainly get all of the benefits accruing from these political adventures. In the light of Stalin's definition of a true internationalist, this is what the Cominform communiqué meant when it denounced the Communist party of Yugoslavia as identifying "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers," a policy "appropriate only to nationalists."

What effect has Tito's departure from the table of "brotherly Communist parties" had on those parties? Titoism is primarily a matter of loyalties. In Yugoslavia, there was no higher loyalty than to the state personified by Tito himself. Consequently, the party, the army, and the new bureaucracy could and did remain faithful to Tito. If Titoism is to spread, similar conditions and a similar concept of limited loyalty must exist in the people's democracies. To date there is no evidence that Titoism has taken root in the effective leadership circles of the satellite states, since both Western-minded and Moscow-trained Communists have been affected by the purges. Certainly the purges of Communist leaders in satellite Europe which have occurred since 1948 afford no index as to the extent of Titoism. The purgees had no machinery for independence of action available to Tito. Even if they had, it is not sure they would have acted as Tito did if faced with the choice.

What effect has the break had on Yugoslavia itself—on its policies and political philosophy? From the time of the break in June 1948 until November 1949, the Yugoslavs inveighed against the Communist parties of the satellites but not against the sacrosanct personage of Joseph Stalin. The second Cominform meeting held in November 1949 proved quite conclusively to Tito that there were no longer any grounds for conciliation, and he prepared a new political

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[For a discussion of the influence of the statute of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of October 1952 on the party statutes in the states of the eastern bloc (i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany) and a reprint of the preambles to the respective party statutes, see E1 Europe, 10: Mehnert, category 116, entire source]